I really like baseball and private finance, however I barely perceive baseball’s sabermetrics and finance analytics. I desire a good story.

The stat guys despise the Tampa Bay Rays’ Chandler Simpson as a result of he solely has a single instrument: pace. The one residence run he’s hit in his whole profession was contained in the park. It is a man who can barely hit a ball out of the infield. I really like him as a result of he’s a unicorn. He has a narrative to inform: 112 stolen bases final 12 months within the minors. For these of you who don’t know baseball, that’s quantity.

Likewise, my eyes spin round in my head once I take a look at Ulcer Indices, Martin ratios, EBITDA, and Bollinger Bands. I don’t have a clue why anybody would wish to take a look at a logarithmic scale after they can view a linear scale with true proportions. Anybody who thinks they’ll predict the long run by taking a look at previous efficiency utilizing charts strikes me as one step under alchemists.

So when crunch time comes for no matter motive, I wish to hear what David Snowball says, or Warren Buffett, or Morningstar human analysts (its AI analyses are ineffective), or any of my mutual fund managers.

Crunch time got here final 12 months on the wings of inflation, and this 12 months on the barge throughout the River Styx to the Tariff Hades. I wished to guage my funds to see which had money in reserve and the way they’d carried out as inflation grew.

I didn’t wish to change my allocation from the standard (and arbitrary) 60 % shares and 40 % bonds. I don’t panic simply, and preserving 60–40 makes it simpler to purchase low and promote excessive once I rebalance my portfolio.

Relatively than drowning in incomprehensible metrics, I made a decision to deal with 4 easy questions that any investor can perceive and consider.

• Does the fund preserve money reserves for protection and alternatives?
• How did it deal with the latest inflationary interval?
• What’s its draw back safety when markets tumble?
• And maybe most significantly—do the managers inform a rational story about their technique and truly speak to shareholders like human beings?

These 4 standards guided me by means of a scientific assessment of my whole portfolio, from large-cap development to small-cap worth to bond funds.

I began my evaluation with Parnassus Core Fairness (PRBLX, PRILX), a beautiful, large-cap fund that I’ve owned since 2002.  It additionally screens corporations for social duty. (For sure, it averted Enron, amongst others.) Its lead supervisor, Todd Ahlsten, writes informative studies; talks with the media incessantly; has occasional shareholder convention calls; and solutions questions personally, regardless of the fund being comparatively massive (due in no small half to its good efficiency through the years). Its draw back seize over the previous 5 years is 73, and Morningstar offers it a Gold score.

Nonetheless, I used to be involved that it’s a fund that at all times stays totally invested, and its high holdings have been (as of March 2025), Microsoft, Amazon, NVIDIA, and Alphabet. With 32 % of its portfolio in tech, I had considerations.

I can’t think about ever promoting my whole place within the fund, but it surely was time to do some rebalancing right into a large-company fund that counterweighted Parnassus.

MFO gave me a lead: Marshfield Concentrated Alternative (MRFOX). It was sitting on 28 % money in March, with no holdings in tech. One in every of three managers had a unicorn background: a Yale Regulation Faculty diploma, and she or he labored for a now-senator whom I respect from my residence state of Massachusetts, Ed Markey. One other supervisor went the Warren Buffett route: an MBA from Columbia. In fact, resumes don’t a fund supervisor make. I used to be impressed with Marshfield’s investing philosophy, the managers’ commentaries, and sure, its draw back seize was simply 51. Over three and 5 years, Morningstar charges it as low danger, excessive return. The truth is, it’s by no means had a shedding calendar 12 months.

So I now personal each Parnassus and Marshfield as my large-cap funds.

However what a few small-company fund? I had owned Neuberger Berman Genesis (NBGNX) for nearly so long as I owned Parnassus. It had served me effectively as a result of its managers didn’t gamble: They put money into smaller corporations that really have actual merchandise and actual earnings. It by no means made as a lot cash in bull markets, but it surely misplaced so much much less in bear markets.

It was at all times totally invested in equities. As inflation and tariff chaos got here on, I puzzled if there was a small-cap fund which may lose even much less and preserve a money reserve. I discovered the fund in a boutique household the place I already owned two funds: FPA Crescent (FPACX), which is an MFO favourite, and FPA Versatile Revenue (FPFIX), which attracted me due to its comparatively brief period (to simplify: a measure of when bonds come due) and its aim to beat inflation over rolling three-year intervals.

The brand new small-cap fund was FPA Queens Street Small Cap Worth (QRSVX). Nevertheless, earlier than I satisfied myself to promote out of Neuberger, I had questions. Whereas its efficiency was equal to Neuberger, and its draw back seize was much less, not like different FPA funds, Queens Street appeared to have only one supervisor, and, of equal concern, that supervisor labored for a subadvisor. In different phrases, it’s a contractual association.

That raised alarms as a result of a former FPA fund, Worldwide Worth, was bought by a third-party firm, and inside a 12 months, the fund divorced its new proprietor and closed. (MFO’s article about it here)

So I wished to listen to from the horse’s mouth in regards to the association that Queens Street has with FPA, and what occurs if the supervisor can’t proceed? I despatched an electronic mail to each FPA and the subadvisor asking that whoever opened it ahead it to Steven Scruggs, the supervisor. It took a few weeks to get a response, however sure, Steve replied, answered my questions, and supplied to speak with me on the telephone. (And sure, he now has a co-manager, and relations with FPA are nice.)

I bought Neuberger and made Queens Street my core small-cap fund, which additionally has a ten % money place.

Lastly, along with the FPA Versatile Revenue bond fund, I had a place in what I referred to as my super-conservative junk-bond fund, BrandywineGlobal Company Credit score (BCAAX). It started its life as Diamond Hill Company Credit score, owned by a smallish firm based mostly in Ohio. In 2021, it bought the fund to the behemoth multinational Franklin Templeton fund-devouring monster. Whereas the managers continued to run the fund effectively, their shareholder communications turned thinner and thinner.

I moved that cash to the much more conservative junk-bond fund, CrossingBridge Low Period Excessive Revenue (CBLVX, CBLVX). To be honest, the supervisor doesn’t take into account his fund to be junk, and Morningstar classifies it as a multisector bond. Nevertheless, in March, 60 % of its portfolio was under funding grade or unrated. Of better significance to me was the period: far shorter than Brandywine, so it could have better flexibility to cope with the chaos economic system.

Once more, I had some questions on how the supervisor, David Sherman, works together with his workforce, and I emailed CrossingBridge. He replied rapidly. Quickly after my funding, I related to his quarterly video convention name. He managed to talk to my low degree whereas giving extra particulars to those that are a lot smarter than I’m.

Backside Line: Since making these portfolio tweaks, the market has climbed larger fairly than crashed (as of mid-Might, as I write). My new funds haven’t essentially outperformed my outdated ones on the upside—and that’s the purpose. I’m not attempting to hit residence runs anymore; I’m enjoying for constant base hits and stolen bases, similar to Chandler Simpson. I can’t predict whether or not we’ll face layoff chain reactions, persistent inflation, crushing client debt, or financial retaliation from former allies in search of independence. However I do know my fund managers have money to deploy, confirmed draw back safety, and the communication expertise to clarify what they’re doing when the chaos arrives.

Postscript: Draw back seize ratios and my funds

How do I measure draw back safety? I take a look at a statistic so easy even I can perceive it: Draw back seize, which is a ratio of how a lot a fund loses in dangerous markets in contrast with its asset-category index (aka benchmark). If the market plummets by 50 %, a fund with a draw back seize of 100 additionally drops by 50 %. But when the fund’s draw back seize is zero, it hasn’t misplaced any cash. That is essential as a result of the much less cash you lose, the better it’s to recuperate. If I lose half of my $100 funding, I’ve $50. To get again as much as $100, my funding would want to extend by one hundred pc. That’s robust, and even with good funds, it might take years to get again to even.

How do you learn that desk? Simple!

After every fund’s title, we establish its Lipper peer group after which share its draw back seize for 2 totally different intervals. Columns 3 and 4 are the draw back seize relative to the inventory market over the previous 18 months, which I establish as a high-inflation interval, and for the reason that fund’s launch. Columns 5 and 6 report the identical data relative to the bond market’s actions. The final column tells you ways lengthy it’s been round; clearly, a fund with 30+ years of historical past would possibly carry a bit extra weight in your thoughts than a fund with six or seven years. For numbers folks, we embody the precise draw back seize (8 means a fund captured 8% of the market’s decline, -11 means a fund rose when the market declined). For the remainder of us, we color-code the field: blue is finest, inexperienced is sweet, yellow is common, orange is under common, and pink (none on my chart!) is the basement.

We solely establish the draw back seize relative to the asset class during which a fund invests: inventory funds versus the S&P 500, earnings funds in opposition to the bond mixture, and FPA Crescent in opposition to each as a result of it invests in each.

As a bonus, we included two different risk-return measures for you. If a fund’s title is in a blue field (FPA Crescent, as an example), that alerts that MFO designates it as a “Nice Owl” fund for having achieved high 20% risk-adjusted returns for the previous 3-, 5- 10-, and 15-year intervals. The MFO Score ranks a fund’s efficiency based mostly on risk-adjusted return, particularly Martin Ratio, relative to different funds in the identical funding class over the identical analysis interval. The identical color-coding applies: blue is high 20%, inexperienced is sweet, and so forth.