Mea culpa: I do know tweeting an distinctive (however totally undocumented!) annual return determine on Jan-1st is now de rigueur for FinTwit, however I’ll keep on with my regular method, so apologies once more for being a bit late with my 2024 annual evaluate. However hey, hopefully a few of you have been nonetheless anticipating it…and this removed from the madding crowd, it now proves a extra leisurely (& helpful) learn! And whereas we’re at it, I ought to in fact apologise for nonetheless being on WordPress, not Substack. For nonetheless plugging away doing this 13+ years later. For nonetheless having no paywall/€XXX annual subscription (I imply, what’s his bloody recreation?!). For nonetheless disclosing precise portfolio adjustments, primarily on a real-time foundation, and offering a completely documented/auditable efficiency monitor file & place sizes – yup, NO look-back buys/sells, after-hours trades, and/or undisclosed hedges right here! – one of many only a few, if not the one (free) funding weblog left on the planet (nonetheless) doing this. Whoops…and for nonetheless calling it an funding weblog, for God’s sake!? And most of all, for nonetheless having no blue checkmark on X…

I do know, possibly I ought to be enthusiastic about altering all that…in any case, it’s human nature for individuals to worth what they really pay for, versus what they get without spending a dime, whatever the precise high quality, amount, and/or worth concerned. And consistently being demoted by the X algorithm (duhhh, no checkmark & helpful third-party hyperlinks in most of my tweets!) is not any enjoyable both. However, I don’t want the cash, and I don’t fancy a brand new ‘boss’. And name me old style, or simply plain outdated troublesome, however I really like having real skin-in-the-game with a inventory, its administration & fellow buyers – it’s the final word alignment with readers & followers who truly analysis & purchase the identical shares I personal – and the unavoidable actuality with any paywall/subscription is that you simply rapidly exhaust your main portfolio holdings & find yourself recommending shares wherein you’re barely invested, or don’t even personal in any respect! I assume embracing that path (& its rewards) is the secret, and arguably it’s completely nice if your prospects obtain truthful warning…however for me, the ‘compensation’ I worth from the weblog is understanding fellow buyers have (ideally) multi-bagged with me, and at worst really feel the identical ache & hopefully lose much less cash than I do on some (inevitable) losers.

[To be fair: In my first (Wexboy) decade, my win ratio was actually 70%, which I concluded was (perversely) too high…ie I needed to re-train my attitude to risk & force myself to start adding more smaller/riskier holdings, which would presumably decrease my win ratio, but also (I suspect) increase my long-term returns overall.]

However time to crack on right here – my FY-2024 Benchmark Return continues to be a easy common of the 4 predominant indices that finest signify my portfolio, and it produced a benchmark +11.6% achieve:

These returns are so predictable now, it’s grow to be extra & extra absurd at this level…the S&P 500 wildly outperformed its long-term common returns once more (& delivered the same old 3/4x return of the FTSE 100 & STOXX Euro 600), and regardless of the particular underlying causes*, mathematically this clearly can’t proceed indefinitely. [*Duhhh, it’s the Magnificent 7…which saw the Nasdaq close up +28.6% last year]. Whereas the ISEQ carried out someplace in between these two extremes, a return to type after an unexpectedly S&P-like efficiency in 2023. Buyers clearly stay usually suspicious of smaller firms, with the FTSE 250 up +4.7%, whereas the Russell 2000 closed up +10.0% (first rate, however a fraction of the S&P/Nasdaq). [It was another down year for the AIM All-Share, at (5.7)%, making the consistently positive returns of so many AIM/small-cap portfolios on UK FinTwit even more tiresome]. Elsewhere, returns weren’t a lot totally different for the MSCI Emerging Markets USD Index (up +5.1%) & the MSCI Frontier Markets USD Index (up +9.5%), however crypto once more delivered spectacular returns with Bitcoin up +121% & Ethereum up +46%.

This yr I’ll resist the urge to opine extra in regards to the markets: We’re solely at the beginning of one other Trump presidency, US nationwide debt’s beginning to spiral uncontrolled (even when DOGE succeeds, received’t the ‘financial savings’ be spent on tax cuts anyway?), we’re prone to see a wave of anti-incumbent/elite populist actions & governments for years to come back within the West (each left & proper), I think we’re in all probability nowhere near completed with an distinctive AI-driven bubble market (which drags know-how & crypto greater too)…and in any case, no person actually is aware of something!? So it’s each man for himself – there’s loads of threat on the market, but additionally loads of alternative to come back – your portfolio & investing fashion will more and more rely upon what you even have the abdomen to imagine in & what you could have the endurance to sleep comfortably with every night time.

So let’s rip the bandage off right here – right here’s my precise Wexboy FY-2024 Portfolio Efficiency, when it comes to particular person winners & losers:

[Gains are based on average stake size (NB: NO actual changes in holdings, except for an imperceptible increase in TFG due to its DRIP) & end-2024 vs. end-2023 share prices. All dividends & FX gains/losses are excluded.]

And ranked by measurement of particular person portfolio holdings:

And once more, merging the 2 collectively – when it comes to particular person portfolio return:

I’m clearly none too happy with a (9.6)% loss for the yr…it’s not disastrous in absolute phrases, however it’s clearly an enormous under-performance relative to my precise benchmark. To not point out, a fraction of the returns generated by each random FinTwit über-portfolio on the market (in fact)!

KR1 is clearly guilty right here (& File doesn’t assist). If I’d restricted myself to the sub-3%/5% KR1 holding I constantly advocate to different buyers, my general return would have been fairly constructive, and if it was absent from my portfolio I’d have broadly matched my benchmark return final yr. However I didn’t, and it wasn’t – which presents some delectable schadenfreude to the same old suspects – you’re welcome!

However this additionally illustrates why the whingers & haters accomplish that badly ultimately…they simply don’t have the imaginative and prescient, or the abdomen, or the endurance, or the attitude, to really discover them (early) & then truly grasp on to the real/long-term compounders. And naturally they received’t bear in mind (or received’t admit) that within the prior yr, KR1’s NAV/share was truly up +178%, the share value itself was up +268%, it was a significant driver of an general +65.4% achieve in my portfolio, and it’s an uncomfortably massive place at present just because it’s turned out to be such an enormous multi-bagger for me during the last 7+ years! Clearly, this can be a high-quality downside to have…

However longer-term readers & followers already see/know this – I’ve written a whole bunch of hundreds of phrases through the years on this weblog about investing & particular investments, and in recent times it actually simply boils all the way down to: i) winners maintain successful – the problem isn’t discovering them, it’s truly holding on to the top quality compounders by thick & skinny to compound your wealth, and ii) diversifying your portfolio as a lot as doable – and I see NO actual proof of that in 95% of the portfolios I encounter on X & the web – to additionally assist defend your wealth. And mockingly I realise that the much less I write now on the weblog, the much less I chop & change positions, the much less I add new write-ups, the higher I illustrate & drive residence that ‘maintain & diversify’ lesson. And once more, when it comes to outcomes, the +26.0% pa returns from my first decade right here (once more, absolutely documented alongside the way in which!) are an incredible endorsement…and whereas my 15 yr returns clearly stay a work-in-progress, I’m very proud of my long-term (personal) returns, which in fact are a key cause the weblog truly exists & my former/now forgotten profession now not does! So, yeah:

Maintain…and diversify!

And with that, let’s do an annual evaluate of my present (disclosed) holdings:

i) Donegal Investment Group ($DQ7A.IR)

FY-2024 +0.6% Achieve. Yr-Finish 0.7% Portfolio Holding.

[NB: Year-end holding reflects (0.1)% impact of the latest return of capital (approved in Nov-24 & settled end Jan-25).]

Deal, or no deal?! Nicely, nonetheless no (ultimate) deal…however not less than Donegal Funding Group introduced one other return of capital earlier than year-end. This displays a continued build-up of internet money to €9.7 million (inc. a bond funding maturity), as of November – sadly, solely half the money was truly utilised, ie €4.8M to redeem 18.15% of all shareholdings at €16.50/share (100% for holdings of fifty shares or much less), which given the details appears far too conservative right here. But it surely’s now retired one other 19.1% of Donegal’s o/s shares, decreasing the online share rely to 1.23M shares.

We additionally noticed a welcome +11% improve in seed potato gross sales (to €33 million) for FY-2024, albeit income does oscillate relying on annual yields/pricing. Underlying working margin was unchanged at 5.0%+, however the division can ship 7-10% margins in its finest years, plus it absolutely absorbs Donegal’s central (board/itemizing/and so forth.) prices, so I nonetheless see a 1.0 to 2.0 P/S deal a number of vary as truthful, particularly accounting for its mental property portfolio, its (absolutely expensed) R&D spending/pipeline & extra price/income synergies within the fingers of a bigger acquirer. [The Nomadic Dairy sale achieved a 1.8 P/S multiple, for comparable reasons]. Minority buyers also needs to be reassured by the administrators’ 6.5% stake & Pageant Investments/Nick Furlong’s 12.7% stake in Donegal, which ought to in the end incentivise & ship a compelling deal.

Put up-capital return, Donegal holds €4.9 million in internet money, €0.6M in funding property & a €0.7M/20% funding in Uktal Seeds (India), versus a €20.3M market cap (at €16.50/share), so buyers are at the moment valuing the seed potato enterprise on a 0.4 P/S a number of!? Which leaves loads of low-risk/event-driven upside on provide right here…alas, it’s 3+ years now for the reason that Nomadic sale & we nonetheless don’t have any public affirmation of a ultimate seed potato sale course of (or of Donegal itself), however in the meantime the corporate pays its method with a 1.8M pa internet revenue, so my predominant frustration right here is definitely the near-zero buying and selling quantity & my lack of ability to re-up my place.

ii) Saga Furs ($SAGCV.HE)

FY-2024 (5.3)% Loss. Yr-Finish 0.8% Portfolio Holding.

One other (small) holding simply marking time right here…although a +7.4% yield made for an general achieve final yr. [Yield’s higher again today at +8.0%, per the higher/proposed dividend]. The corporate did appoint a brand new CFO (internally), however in any other case it’s principally enterprise as regular. Annual pelt volumes normalised again to 10.5 million in FY-2024, however a +20% improve in costs delivered a mere (3)% decline in whole brokerage gross sales to €343M. Sadly, a decrease take price & unexpectedly low financing revenue meant earnings per share almost halved to €0.73/share. Nonetheless, that is attributable to a poor H1, with pelt volumes down sharply by (35)% in the important thing March public sale, so H2 eps of €0.68/share appears way more indicative of Saga’s present run-rate, and is supported by a restructuring which eradicated expense within the defunct Dutch & Danish markets, plus some extra native personnel/rental expense. [Justified as a response to lower volumes, but could/should be a nice tailwind as scheduled FY-25 volumes (at 10.0M) are in line with the medium-term average of 10M+ pelts, and financing income ideally picks up again]. Administration actually appears to be indicating this with a 97% payout ratio (ie a proposed €0.71/share dividend).

That H2 annualised run-rate is €1.36/share, not far off the typical €1.51 eps we noticed within the final 4 years (vs. a ten.7 million pelt common), which pegs Saga Furs on a 6.5 P/E, vs. a €8.90 market value at present. Alas, there’s little signal buyers will award the next a number of, within the absence of any form of sustained progress trajectory. That being stated, you acquire a +8% yield, and worth buyers on X & the message boards are inclined to rediscover Saga each two/three years & bid it as much as €12.00+ & even €17.00+ value ranges, not less than briefly. And there’s nonetheless the potential of Chinese language acquirer (alas, a Russian bidder’s off the desk), however who is aware of the timing/IRR of such an consequence. Paradoxically, one of the best consequence right here could be an precise (phased) shutdown of the fur business in Finland/Europe…in that state of affairs, I’m fairly assured a Saga Furs wind-down would ship its present €25+ NAV per share, so how about one final ESG win?!

iii) Tetragon Financial Group ($TFG.AS)

FY-2024 +42% Achieve. Yr-Finish 3.5% Portfolio Holding.

[NB: Year-end holding reflects a new (pre-yearend) 1.0% increase in my position, as I confirmed Jan-1st on X.]

There have been three predominant NAV drivers final yr: The primary was Hawke’s Point, which funds top quality mining initiatives within the Australian (& North American) useful resource sector – its worth grew nearly +70%/+$80 million final yr, net-net, albeit masking vital (draw back) volatility alongside the way in which from a peak $320M worth as of end-October. [One can hardly complain about the overall net gain!] The second is Ripple Labs A&B Most well-liked Inventory, which gained an astonishing 130%+/$135M+, within the final two months of the yr, reflecting its SEC win earlier within the yr, the election of Trump & a brand new crypto-friendly administration in November, and a subsequent 4/seven-fold achieve in $XRP’s market value. Third, we noticed a +25%/+$185M achieve in Tetragon’s 75%+ stake in Equitix, acquired the welcome news in October of an precise sale course of (nonetheless ongoing at present), and affirmation TFG’s stake had elevated to 81.5% however would now accrue a tail/income legal responsibility to former Equitix administration (for the second, I’m assuming it nonetheless nets again out to an efficient 75% stake). All instructed, much less dividends & a measly $25M tender provide – that’s lower than 1% of NAV & barely 40%+ of the tender presents in 2023 – these good points in worth internet out to a near-$350M NAV improve final yr.

This yr, hopefully we see an precise sale of Equitix – a £1.5 billion price ticket has been floated, vs. $14B+ of AUM, reflecting different current offers & a voracious urge for food for different/infrastructure asset managers. That value could also be a bit wealthy, however I’d anticipate an precise deal to nonetheless provide vital upside for Tetragon’s 75%+ stake, vs. a year-end $922 million worth. [Which would again confirm the (prudent) valuations assigned to TFG Asset Management, which is currently valued at $1.6B vs. $41.2B in AUM (up 50% from $27.4B at end-2019)]. And such a deal may clearly equate to 80%+ of Tetragon’s present market cap – and internet debt’s nonetheless below 10% of gross belongings, so there’s no urgent have to repay any of it – in order that’s the place the rubber actually meets the highway:

Both Griffith & Expensive flex their management muscle tissues, try to reinvest the money & personally acquire the charges on the administration contract for an additional 5/10 years, OR they really give attention to enhancing/realising shareholder worth by way of a massively accretive tender provide for an enormous % of Tetragon’s o/s shares. The previous was buyers’ default assumption to this point (& rightly so), however because the principals age out (& wish to probably revalue/realise their very own stake), and TFG’s different administration/workers foyer re their steadily rising stake, and noting the sheer scale of this potential deal, the percentages shift in favour of the latter…clearly it’s nonetheless a wholly event-driven state of affairs, however IF we see a sale & IF we see an enormous tender provide, then we’ll additionally see a step-change in sentiment & the NAV low cost. Additional, let’s hope we are able to additionally add some crypto pixie-dust to the equation – again of the envelope, Tetragon now owns someplace between 2.25%-2.5% of Ripple Labs, whose personal market (fairness) worth is at the moment value one thing like $14/$15.5 billion at present, vs. its precise treasury of 43.3B+ $XRP, which is at the moment value one thing like $107B! That’s a hell of a worth hole, one that would probably be closed/realised by way of what I’d name an anti-$MSTR technique, ie (regularly) promoting $XRP crypto & shopping for Ripple fairness.

And Ripple Labs has already began down this highway – executing two/three tender presents within the final yr, funded from $XRP gross sales – a method that would appeal to much more consideration & be additional refined IF Ripple & Brad Garlinghouse truly suggest an IPO, now that Trump’s within the White Home. So yeah, it’s positively a good suggestion right here to do the mathematics & determine the potential/uneven upside for Tetragon on its Ripple Labs stake…vs. its present $1.3B market cap (& a possible/impending sale of Equitix).

iv) VinaCapital Vietnam Opportunity Fund ($VOF.L)

FY-2024 +2.6% Achieve. Yr-Finish 4.8% Portfolio Holding.

The VinaCapital Vietnam Alternative Fund efficiency in 2024 – truly an general 5%+ achieve, together with a +2.5% yield – appears to be like very very similar to 2023, however once more this obscures a a lot more healthy Vietnamese market. The VN Index was truly up one other 12%+, however this was mitigated by the dong depreciation we’ve seen during the last three years & which accelerated to (5.1)% in 2024 – not stunning, given the greenback energy we noticed elsewhere in Asia (& globally). By way of VOF’s London itemizing, a touch weaker sterling helped, however shareholder returns have been additional harm by a widening of the NAV low cost from 18% to 23%+.

This displays: i) the pervasive London valuation low cost, which is commonly justified (domestically) however presents an unimaginable alternative to purchase into worldwide publicity/firms on a budget, and ii) continued investor aversion to any form of frontier/rising markets funding. The latter is especially irritating as Vietnam’s on the FTSE Russell watchlist to be promoted from Frontier to Rising Market standing, which might immediate vital inflows (whatever the normal investor apathy). It additionally belies the VOF group’s wonderful in-house IR operate, which supplies common/detailed communication with shareholders, periodic buyers displays & roadshows, a steady share buyback programme, and ensured a seamless portfolio administration transition after the premature loss of life of Andy Ho (VinaCapital’s CIO) final June.

Evidently, the brief & long-term outlook are nonetheless as promising as ever. Vietnam is the new China – it has a younger & comparatively well-educated workforce which under-cuts China’s labour prices & may also transfer up the export curve, it’s already a major marketplace for China outsourcing, it has a robust buying and selling relationship with the US, its GDP progress has accelerated to 7%+ whereas inflation’s regular round 3%, and regardless of some current political in-fighting & musical chairs it does a much better/extra relaxed job than China of balancing a capitalist financial system vs. one occasion communist management. However, Trump’s tariff bazooka may current a brand new menace, however arguably political/tariff tensions with China will proceed to assist Vietnam as a substitute export market & a de facto China-US entrepôt. As for the market itself, it now trades on a ten.3 ahead P/E, vs. 13-15%+ earnings progress (in 2024 & 2025), with the VNI buying and selling simply shy resistance at 1,290-1,310 (for nearly three years now) & probably all set for a significant rally & new 1,500+ all-time-highs if this resistance stage can lastly be damaged. Comparable resistance & ATHs lie forward for VOF, and in the meantime its portfolio mixture of public fairness, PIPE, OTC/pre-IPO shares & actual property investments provides necessary & distinctive diversification versus its peer funds.

v) Record ($REC.L)

FY-2024 (25)% Loss. Yr-Finish 5.1% Portfolio Holding.

[NB: After a YTD (12)% share price decline, I subsequently increased my position by +0.9% from 4.5% (at the time) to a 5.4% holding, as I confirmed Jan-18th on X. #REC’s rallied +17% since.]

File managed to comply with up a (22)% loss in 2023 with a (25)% share value loss in 2024…this was mitigated by a +7.3% yield, however nonetheless calls for the apparent query: How was I so flawed about certainly one of my largest holdings? Nicely, as an alternative, I purchased extra #REC in January! Which looks like a direct violation of my regular mantra to ‘common up, not down!’…in all probability the toughest lesson any investor can hope to study & grasp.

But it surely highlights an necessary nuance right here – the main target is at all times on the enterprise, not the share value – ie your finest long-term compounders (inevitably) come from averaging up & into the rising KPIs/constructive enterprise trajectory of an incredible enterprise (usually mirrored in a rising share value/valuation), not averaging down on a declining enterprise (even at an ever cheaper value/valuation). And likewise highlights the disconnect between short-term buyers who obsess over the share value, the most recent outcomes (vs. dealer consensus!?) & are simply suckered into the same old ‘value drives narrative’ spiral, versus buyers who ignore the noise & give attention to the long-term (absolute) progress trajectory of a enterprise. In File’s case, income’s up 75%+ & earnings per share greater than doubled within the final 3.5 years, whereas AUM’s close to an all-time-high at $100.5 billion…that’s what I’m truly averaging up on right here.

Bother is, in FY-24 & H1-25, File has been: i) consolidating the aggressive AUM, income & earnings progress of the prior two years, ii) investing in greater wages & extra workers, an IT in-house restructuring/redevelopment, and new merchandise, enterprise strains & AUM (inc. a brand new €1.1 billion+ infrastructure fairness fund launch from its new 41%-owned RAM sub.) to diversify & assist its medium-term progress technique*, and iii) managing the transition to a complete new era of administration, particularly responding to the long-anticipated retirements of Leslie Hill & Steve Cullen with the appointment (internally) of Jan Witte as CEO & Richard Heading (ex-Group FD of IG Group) as CFO. This left eps flat/down marginally during the last yr & a half, with the share value spiraling decrease in response, compounded by a savage & relentless bear market in an in any other case unrelated UK-listed asset administration sector (with most share costs hitting new 5/10 yr lows in the previous couple of months).

[*And yes, Witte & Heading clearly need to refine & reiterate this strategy at the next FY results. Exploring the idea of adding more external talent/partnerships like RAM would be very welcome too – recruiting a couple of the City’s top cold callers & deal closers would inject some killer instinct into the culture, and some external partnerships (for example, in Asia) would help tap what is a relatively unlimited potential TAM for Record’s FX business].

However isn’t that how markets work…earnings pause = degrowth = derating?! Yeah however, what’s the best a number of if File delivered +23% pa eps progress during the last 3.5 years? A 25+ P/E would possibly work, proper? However that’s what File truly delivered…besides it was +46% pa eps progress over two years, then (2)% pa over 1.5 years! And therefore, REC trades on a sub-10 P/E at present (vs. H1 annnualised eps of 5.62p), and buyers even query whether or not its present +9.5% yield is sustainable. [Yes, it is…noting 7.4p/share of surplus net cash & how sticky Record’s business actually is!]. Whereas I stay assured, as do former owner-operators Neil File & Leslie Hill (who nonetheless personal a 36%+ stake, in combination), of File’s precise intrinsic worth (and/or potential deal worth!?) & its longer-term progress technique – I absolutely anticipate the £60 million income & 40% working margin targets that Hill initially set might be attained in the end, presuming continued AUM progress/diversification, good execution & substantial working leverage, and can ship 10p+ earnings per share accordingly. With REC buying and selling 52p+/share once more, breaking important 58p assist/resistance stage would sign a return to its current 62-70p value vary…in the meantime, buyers should buy a top quality recurring enterprise on a 2.0 EV/Income a number of, versus a 31% working margin, a 42% incremental working revenue margin over the previous couple of years & in the end a possible 65%+ incremental working margin.

vi) Alphabet ($GOOGL)

FY-2024 +36% Achieve. Yr-Finish 13.9% Portfolio Holding.

And what a juggernaut Alphabet is…it took 15 years to succeed in $100 billion in income, and solely one other 6 years to succeed in $300B! In FY-2024, income was up one other +14% to surpass $350B (with YouTube & Cloud now on a $110B run-rate), working revenue was up +31% as working margins continued increasing to 32%, and earnings per share was additionally up +31%. Which mirrors what we’ve seen during the last 5 years, with income greater than doubling & working revenue/eps compounding at 27% pa. Which highlights how (absurdly) low-cost the corporate nonetheless is right here, buying and selling on a 20.5 ahead P/E. Which, for a lot the identical causes as I initially detailed, would indicate a P/E within the teenagers for the precise core enterprise…so $GOOGL’s multi-bagged since I first wrote it up in 2017 (‘So Why Not Google It..?’), however continues to be principally simply as low-cost at present!

Yeah however, the haters refrain – what if Alphabet loses the AI Wars? And isn’t Search going to zero anyway…if Bing didn’t kill it off already?! And all the opposite questions they requested 5 years in the past & 5 years therefore, although they could by no means truly step up & purchase $GOOGL – why even argue with them, when each set of outcomes are the one rebuttal wanted.

However all that doubt & nervousness highlights a basic misunderstanding of the dangers & alternatives. Zooming in on Search, it’s important to grasp its core monetization drivers are literally a fairly restricted (however extremely priceless) sub-set of your complete universe of search queries – ie it’s primarily shoppers researching & truly/probably shopping for merchandise & companies, and Search stays probably the most environment friendly method to do this. And that’s why Google now fortunately supplies an AI Overview for many queries – it enhances the consumer expertise & doesn’t disrupt the underlying enterprise mannequin, since most queries aren’t essentially monetizable anyway. That being stated, we’re on the verge of agentic AI, so Search economics will migrate into that consumer expertise too, and/or grow to be an precise recurring income subscription mannequin by way of a private digital assistant.

As for the massive image, it’s value highlighting Google/Alphabet was/is the world’s largest & finest AI firm (go on, attempt clarify your life & the world pre-Google Search to your children!?). And Open AI was constructed on Google’s Transformer mannequin/structure. And Anthropic successfully spun out of Open AI. And DeepSeek clearly leveraged off Open AI/ChatGPT. And fashions/groups will clearly proceed to bootstrap/leverage off pre-existing information/fashions/groups on the highway to AGI & ASI – in any case, that’s how human intelligence works too. And it’s now turning into way more apparent that AI is inevitably open-source, and can grow to be extra & extra pervasive in our lives by way of the cloud & (smartphone) edge computing.

Digesting all that, and weighing it up versus what DeepSeek’s simply achieved (to not point out Chinese GPUs!?), the precise winners & trajectory of the {hardware} arms race are nonetheless not completely apparent to me…however alternatively, Jevons Paradox in all probability does kick in, ie the cheaper/higher/quicker AI will get, the extra we use, the extra underlying {hardware}/infrastructure we’ll inevitably want whatever the precise quantum of required price/effectivity/and so forth. Due to this fact: i) to purchase (& truly maintain holding!) the likes of Nvidia, and so forth. may nicely show difficult alongside the way in which, so timing & entry value might be critically necessary, but additionally ii) Alphabet committing to $75B in capex spending for 2025 is totally the proper technique – when it comes to its cashflow (& money pile), it’s clearly an inexpensive wager, whereas not making the funding may show an existential menace.

However I’m extremely assured the final word beneficiaries of AI are the businesses who can truly plug it in & monetize it seamlessly in all facets of our every day lives, our smartphones (& smart-glasses), our laptops, our autonomous autos. And naturally Alphabet’s already THE apparent/successful candidate – and sure, Apple one other candidate, as are Alibaba & Tencent behind the Chinese language firewall – because it at the moment boasts seven totally different merchandise/platforms with 2 BILLION+ USERS EACH (all of whom can already entry/use Gemini). Which in my e book makes $GOOGL the most important & finest AI wager you may make right here…and likewise an apparent potential hedge for the remainder of your portfolio, your work-life & your loved ones.

vii) KR1 ($KR1.AQ)

FY-2024 (30)% Loss. Yr-Finish 15.8% Portfolio Holding.

KR1 was a giant disappointment in 2024, and watching Bitcoin rally 120%+ & hit new $108K+ all-time-highs alongside the way in which, whereas KR1 truly fell (30)%, was clearly painful for a lot of shareholders. [Again, I should obviously highlight this follows a +268% gain for KR1 & massive out-performance vs. $BTC/$ETH in 2023]. Alas, this divergence was not totally surprising, and positively not the primary time we’ve seen this specific film…once more, I’d sum it up as:

$BTC  ==>  $ETH  ==>  #alts  ==>  #KR1

The funding & the good points come first in Bitcoin (whereas $BTC maximalists triumphantly declare $ETH/#alts/and so forth. are all going to ZERO!), then unfold out/rollover into (bigger) good points in Ethereum, then spill over into (even bigger) good points in #alts, and at last ship (probably exponential) good points for KR1. [Rem, my last major KR1 write-up caught this inflection point perfectly back in late-2020, with the KR1 share price doing a 15x & the valuation multiple expanding from sub-0.8 P/B to a 2.5+ P/B in just three months!] And no, I don’t assume it’s totally different this time…certain, the regulatory acceptance & institutionalization of Bitcoin final yr might have delayed the same old roll-over into Ethereum (‘solely’ up +46% final yr), however I’m hopeful this new/secular crypto allocation course of (into investor portfolios) will mitigate/get rid of the same old crypto summer time/winter cycle(s) to this point.

So sure, I’m assured the actual good points for $ETH, #alts & KR1 are probably nonetheless forward. And I believe $BTC maxis ought to be lauded & mocked right here…ie they principally persuaded the world that blockchain is an extremely priceless know-how, however nonetheless need the world to imagine such a foundational know-how ought to/might be restricted to a single ‘utility’ developed/launched 16 years in the past!? Which appears fairly foolish to me…so let me repeat my thesis:

‘Bitcoin’s in the end a wager on value…blockchain’s a wager on innovation!‘

And that’s what KR1 is – from day one, it’s eschewed Bitcoin & proof-of work, focusing as an alternative on investing in early stage crypto/blockchain initiatives (which in flip, primarily give attention to constructing out your complete/inter-connected infrastructure of the crypto universe) & on producing proof-of-stake revenue. And recognising it’s nonetheless a brand new know-how (& asset class), the KR1 group constructed the corporate to outlive any form of volatility – as a result of crypto beta is unavoidable – in order that they centered on diversification, and averted all the same old debt, dilution & catastrophe different crypto-stocks have been so lethal at delivering for his or her shareholders. I name it the ZERO funding thesis…KR1 boasts ZERO {hardware}, power use, debt, dilution, taxes & capital required!

Over the past 8.5 years, this endurance & the distinctive alpha of KR1’s diversified early-stage portfolio has truly delivered the best-in-class crypto-stock funding monitor file on the planet…ie a +75% pa/11,125%+ return in each KR1’s NAV/share & share value. No different crypto-stock (or stonk) comes shut. And no different crypto-stock generates any form of recurring revenue, not to mention free money move…whereas KR1’s truly generated a mean £14 million pa in staking revenue during the last three years, together with £13.0M in FY-2024 (& an £11.4M run-rate in December) vs. a present £86M/$107M market cap!). And word there’s an precise 95% NET margin on that staking revenue…and I don’t imply the bullshit margin nonsense crypto-miners (for instance) present, I actually imply a 95% revenue margin with zero {hardware}/power prices, zero incremental G&A, zero curiosity prices, zero taxes & zero capital required.

That being stated, KR1 is not a widows & orphans inventory…it’s nonetheless primarily quoted on Aquis (albeit, it’s an RIE similar to the LSE), spreads might be huge, it could require endurance to construct (& exit) a place, and it might even require a full-service dealer commerce! Which is seemingly such a tall order, you possibly can nonetheless purchase KR1 on just about the most cost effective crypto-stock a number of (a 0.82 P/B as of year-end, a lot the identical as end-2023 (a 0.84 P/B) & again in Jul-2016 (a 0.85 P/B), with the share value/NAV notably decrease once more YTD), regardless of it boasting one of the best +75% pa monitor file on this planet! And many KR1 punters will bitch & moan the group may/ought to do a greater job…which is clearly grossly unfair, noting their spectacular monitor file. I’d put it extra diplomatically…there’s an excessive amount of cash (inc. the group’s, since they now personal ~25% of KR1, in order that they have loads of skin-in-the-game/alignment with fellow shareholders) being left on the desk right here, whenever you evaluate KR1 to the (a lot greater) multiples & cash flowing to different/vastly inferior crypto-stocks, and many icing to be added to the cake (so as of precedence):

i) Add an expert in-house IR/PR operate & guarantee additionally they have some skin-in-the-game – there’s a military of potential buyers on the market who nonetheless do not know KR1 exists, and/or want IR story to even take into account researching/shopping for the inventory.

ii) Up-list/dual-list KR1 from Aquis to the London Inventory Trade – once more, that draws a brand new military of potential buyers – if David Lenigas can up-list his newest promotional crypto-stock (Vinanz) to the LSE in a matter of weeks, then the FCA, LSE & KR1 group have little excuse to not do the identical.

iii) Re-activate KR1’s share buyback authority, coupled with an expert IR/PR marketing campaign, to soak up staking revenue, improve NAV/share, enhance investor sentiment & broaden KR1’s valuation a number of.

iv) Re-accelerate the tempo of funding – the group invested in three new initiatives in 2024 (Tanssi, Mode & Avail), which stack up/construct on its present unlisted portfolio, since there’s usually a 2-3 yr journey to main-net today – however that present pipeline will have to be topped up/re-filled in the end.

Once more, I believe it’s now prudent & wise for all buyers to think about a 3-5% crypto allocation of their portfolio, and I’d advocate a long-term KR1 holding as a diversified portfolio/best-in-class funding monitor file that may fulfill some/all of that allocation. [If preferred, along with some $BTC ETF exposure…I do not recommend leveraged $BTC ETFs or vehicles (like $MSTR or the crypto-miners), or any promotional crypto-stonks with no track record of creating any real intrinsic value]. And for fellow buyers, I’m additionally alerting you to the just-released information of Redstone Finance’s upcoming main-net – KR1 invested in its 2021 & 2022 pre-seed/seed rounds, and my default assumption is that they find yourself with ~1% (ie someplace between 0.8% & 1.2%) of the challenge/1.0 billion $RED provide – KR1’s $0.4 million funding in Redstone to this point is immaterial vs. its present NAV, however as we’ve seen earlier than (with Celestia, for instance) the potential worth of its upcoming $RED allocation may show very materials to KR1’s present £86M/$107M market cap!?

Okay, that’s it – if in case you have any questions, please simply ask.

And better of luck in 2024..!